The Media and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

The author is a postdoctoral fellow, Centre for the Study of Democracy/University of Westminster, London.

The role of mass media is often analysed alongside that of parliaments, executives, political parties and elections. Indeed, media has been quite influential in determining the type of political regime, particularly during the period of transition to democracy in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. These opportunities for the media to influence the political climate have appeared as a result of the diminishing role of political parties as intermediaries between state elites and citizens, on the one hand, and increasing influence of international factors on the domestic political arena, on the other. [1] Although it is hard to quantify the direct impact of media on political behaviour and decision-making processes, it is clear that media fills important gaps in social and political communication, serving as a powerful factor of consolidation of democracy.

Private versus Independent

Until not long ago, one of the crucial criteria determining the relative independence of media in post-Communist Europe was its being private, rather than State-owned. This seemed to be a valid argument at the time, especially against the experience of domination of media by nomenklatura. Nowadays, international bodies that monitor media freedom have pointed out that autocratic rulers have devised new and subtler methods to silence independent and alternative sources of information. [2]

Firstly, media can be concentrated in the hands of people close to the political regime who do not necessarily aim at improving democratic performance, but are primarily profit-driven. [3] Secondly, it has been almost a trend in autocratic regimes that political elites have attempted to establish a monopoly on television and radio, and, occasionally, even on the Internet.

In Central-Eastern Europe, the freedom of the media seems to be steadily improving, not least because of the vast help provided by the EU and Western media. [4] A great percentage of the printed and broadcast media is currently in the hands of independent foreign or local private owners. [5] And even though some CEE political leaders have shown themselves ready to control the flow of information, in practice they have not imposed explicit restrictions on the media or on free access to public information because of substantial domestic and international pressure. [6]

Despite the progress achieved in many countries of the former Communist Bloc, the present picture of media reform is far from optimistic, and difficult social and political conditions are not altogether conducive to the consolidation of democracy. [7] The general impression is that the media frequently becomes a target of abuse and, at the same time, represents the most common means in the hands of autocratic rulers to vilify political opponents and manipulate public opinion.

Some political rulers, after having been elected, increasingly supported different authoritarian tendencies and practices, especially in the public media. The best-known examples of this phenomenon in post-Communist Europe have been Tudjman’s Croatia, Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, Meciar’s Slovakia and Berisha’s Albania (especially at the end of his rule). Certain politicians have assumed that State media should continue to act as their mouthpiece, or that they could appoint “politically friendly” personalities to media boards and broadcast commissions to serve their interests. This has happened in many post-Communist countries in the region, occasionally resulting in bitter “media wars” between TV and printed media directors, on the one hand, and politicians, on the other. [8] Some prominent political leaders in Eastern Europe have used their position of authority and their influence over the public media to portray themselves as uncorrupted and standing above the political institutions and other political elites. [9]

The more discreet methods of censorship have been reinforced by close contacts of people in power with representatives of the business elite that have kept a virtual monopoly on advertisement, both in broadcast and printed media. The news outlets of the opposition parties have been systematically obstructed from reaching their audiences by “softer” legal and economic restrictions: broadcasting licences, intervention in the operation of the distribution networks of printed media, and so forth. [10]

While absence of reliable information does not allow full assessment of the immediate effect of these subtle measures to limit independence of the media, even where privately-owned, it stands to reason that such measures affect citizens’ perceptions about the government, and limit public awareness of opposition viewpoints. [11]

Media Between Market and Authority

The impact of mass media on consolidation of democracy can be reinforced or diminished in cases where it operates as an element of political life and in conjunction with other institutions or institutional arrangements.

In all countries undergoing transition to and consolidation of democracy, there are many factors influencing the general type of media regime and the behaviour of media actors. The absence of certain institutional guarantees present in mature democracies, such as laws regulating the media market and protecting journalists from interference in their work, have a negative influence on the media sector undergoing major transformation. [12] At the level of public communication between social actors and representatives of the media, there is also a need in formal rules regulating the relationship between journalists and politicians, especially when the latter serve as a major source of information for media professionals. [13]

The obvious weakness of other important intermediaries of public communication in consolidated democracies, such as political parties, interest groups and social movements, allows the media in Central-Eastern Europe to play a more powerful role in the political sphere than in already established democracies of Western Europe. [14] The role of media in shaping public opinion during elections, for example, is particularly crucial. [15] It has been estimated that in Central-Eastern Europe television has overshadowed political parties as a means of intermediation between the governing elites and citizens. So-called “media parties” have emerged – small in numbers but relying on the charisma of the political leadership of their parties. In the early days of transition to democracy in the region, the presidential elections in Poland in December 1990 and in Bulgaria in January 1992 brought relative success to maverick politicians, such as the “self-made” Western businessmen Stanislaw Tyminski and George Gantchev. These political leaders relied chiefly on populist tactics and on the media effect to win over potential voters.

The adaptation of the media to the population’s rising expectations is further complicated by various factors linked to the political transition in Central-Eastern Europe. Public opinion in most post-Communist countries has still little impact on the processes affecting the distribution of media resources. Instead, it tends typically to follow a path of compliance with the powerful unregulated market mechanisms guiding the news media. In such conditions, the ongoing transformation of the political system may be perceived as “entertainment,” where personal appearance and extravagant behaviour portrayed by the media matter more than political ideals and affiliations to social or political issues. [16]

Politically frustrated and entertainment-driven audiences, desiring more drama and TV shows, are an important driving force behind the transformation of the media sector in the entire region. The rapid and uncontrolled privatisation of most media resources, for example, in Russia during the mid-1990s led to the penetration of former nomenklatura and new oligarchy interests into public radio and television. This has allowed various nationalistic and populist leaders to voice their propaganda with the help of recently-privatised broadcast companies. [17]

In other countries in Central-Eastern Europe, the arrival of foreign capital and the growing consumerism of the population, fuelled by powerful advertising campaigns, have influenced media policy to such an extent that virtually from the beginning of its free existence, news media has been obliged to follow rigid market principles reminiscent of the era of wild capitalism.

With deregulation of the media market, the role of market forces and institutions driving liberal economics has been increasing in importance. On the one hand, numerous publications and television and radio programmes which appeared during the heyday of early democracy in 1989-91 turned out to be economically non-viable and simply could not live up to expectations of an increasingly more objective and versatile media. On the other hand, with the survival and consolidation of some large Eastern European press and broadcasting companies and the arrival of even larger Western ones, there are still lingering fears that the tyranny of the State may easily be substituted by the tyranny of the market.

Conclusion

Although competitive and private media may not always be at ease with the democratic process, diverse and independent media undoubtedly contribute to the consolidation of democracy. The media can play the role of the “Fourth Estate” alongside other state governance institutions. However the media can perform this function only if endowed with several key characteristics and is able to satisfy certain societal needs. [18]

Most importantly, the media should:

• be pluralistic and free of excessive governmental or private ownership control and censorship;
• provide citizens with information about political candidates and events;
• be vigilant against corruption practices and tendencies;
• keep public figures accountable in the public realm;
• scan information and set the agenda for politicians and citizens in the domestic and international arena;
• open communication channels and organise a dialogue among the various elements of society concerning everyday problems, chiefly with respect to the protection of ethnic and minority rights.

Finally, with the rapid professionalisation of and exposure to foreign know-how and capital, both the printed and broadcast media in post-communist Europe have shifted their attention from the needs of the population to the strict requirements of the global media market. Although it is difficult to combine the public interest with the competitive market element in the content of media programmes even in established Western societies, it is nevertheless crucial to aim towards this goal if one is to maintain a high-quality democratic regime.

Footnotes

[1] J. Blumler, Communicating to Voters, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publication, 1983; J. Blumler, and M. Gurevitch, The Crisis of Public Communication, London: Routledge Publishers, 1995; D. McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, 3rd edition, Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1996.

[2] See, for example, annual reports on media freedom by the Freedom House, Journalistes sans Frontiers, European Media Institute (EMI), as well as regular reports on free access to public information in Central-Eastern Europe by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Transparency International (TI).

[3] K. H. Jamieson and K. Campbell, The Interplay of Influence: Advertising, Politics, and the Mass Media, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992.

[4] See footnote 3.

[5] R. Merritt, “Normalising the East German Media,” Political Communication, No. 11 (1994), pp. 49-66; R. Dimitrov, “Borbata za Chetvurtata Vlast v Iztochna Evropa. 7: Kude sme Nie?” (The Struggle for the Fourth Estate in Eastern Europe. Part 7: Where are We?), Kontinent 5, April 1996, p. 11.

[6] P. C. Wasburn, “Democracy and Media Ownership: Comparison of Commercial, Public and Government Broadcast News,” Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 17 (1995), pp. 647-676; W. Hoffmann-Reim, Regulating Media: The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in Six Countries, NY: the Guilford Press, 1996.

[7] Freedom House, “Press Freedom in the World,” Freedom House Surveys, 1995-1999 (reports on media freedom in Eastern Europe and CIS, under supervision of Leonard. N. Sussman).

[8] E. Hankiss, “The Hungarian Media’s War of Independence,” Analysis of the Centre for Social Studies, Budapest, Hungary, 1993; E. M. Kramer, “Reversal of Fortunes: Rehabilitations and Counter-purges in Bulgaria,” A. Hester and K. White, (eds.), Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993, pp. 161-190.

[9] A. Shalnev, “On to Yegas – Glasnost for Russian Press,” Media Studies Journal, Autumn 1993, pp. 81-86; M. Radojkovic, “Mass Media Between State Monopoly and Individual Freedom: Media Restructuring and Restriction in Former Yugoslavia,” European Journal of Communications, No. 9 (1994): pp. 137-148; O. V. Johnson, “East Central and South-eastern Europe, Russia, and the Newly Independent States,” in John C. Merrill, (ed.), Global Journalism: Survey of International Communication, 3rd edition, Whyte Plains, NY: Longman, 1995, pp. 153-187.

[10] J. Halloran, The Effects of Television, London: Panther Books, 1970; D. Kellner, Television and the Crisis of Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. On Internet surveillance and restrictions, see Freedom House, “Journalists as Pariah” and “Press Law Epidemic: A Year of Restrictions,” Press Freedom Report, NY: Freedom House, 1996 and 1997.

[11] See, for example, J. Blondel, “The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the Democratisation Process,” in I. Marsh, J. Blondel and T. Inoguchi, (eds.), Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance. East and Southeast Asia, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999, p. 30.

[12] L. Sussman, “The Year of Press Law Debates: Much Talk, Little Progress as Officials and Journalists in Eurasia and Eastern Europe Try to Define Press Freedom,” Editor and Publisher, 2 January 1993: p. 28; L. Stoyanova, “The New Legislation,” Balkan Media, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1994), pp. 38-39. Moreover, constitutional and other legal requirements reserving programme time for minority group broadcasts and stipulating the percentage of cultural and sports programmes and advertisement slots are much-needed specifications for the operation of democratic media. See, for example, T. Petev, “Transitive Democratisation of the Bulgarian Press: Postponed Victories,” in N. Genov, (ed.), Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Bulgarian Sociological Association, 1994; A. Orcutt, “Optimism, Pessimism, and Paradox: Broadcast Press Freedom in Slovakia,” in A. Hester and K. White, (eds.), Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993, pp. 311-339.

[13] O. V. Johnson, “Whose Voice? Freedom of Speech and the Media in Central Europe,” in Hester and White, (eds.), Creating Free Press in Eastern Europe, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993, pp. 153-187; E. Ognianova and B. Scott, “Milton’s Paradox. The Market-place of Ideas in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” European Journal of Communication, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1997), pp. 369-390.

[14] C. Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media, Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1974; R. M. Entman, Democracy Without Citizens, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989; Balcerowicz, op. cit.

[15] H. Semetko, J. C. Blumer, M. Gurevitch and D. H. Weaver, The Formation of Campaign Agendas, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991.

[16] L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, Budapest: CEU Press, 1995, pp. 152-153, referring to a “visibility effect” of broadcast media, esp. p. 153; T. Laitila, “Journalistic Codes of Ethics in Europe,” European Journal of Communications, 10(4), 1995, pp. 527-544.

[17] B. McNair, “Media in Post-Soviet Russia,” European Journal of Communication, No. 9, 1994: pp. 115-135.

[18] A. King, (ed.), Power of Communication, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1987; J. Keane, (ed.), Media and Democracy, NY: Polity Press, 1991; P. J. Humphreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.