The Rising Tide of Euroscepticism

Throughout the 1990s, one attitude united the differing opinions of the vast majority of Central and Eastern Europeans: that entry into the EU should be a prime national goal. But while governments in the region have welcomed the announcement that eight post-communist countries might join by 2004, there has been a striking erosion of public support in many countries.

A picture of regional responses to accession shows an uninformed public struggling with what they perceive as an increasingly unappetizing proposition. A lack of transparency about the process of accession itself, combined with fears that they will not be offered an equal share of the cake, are slowly turning much of the Central European public away from the idea of enlargement.

Public support for enlargement may still be higher in Central Europe than within the EU, but the latest Eurobarometer survey, released by the European Commission in December 2001, indicates that large swathes of the population are now against joining. In Estonia and Latvia, 41 percent would say 'no' in a vote, and the rates are also significant in Poland (33 percent), Lithuania (29 percent), Slovenia (28 percent), and the Czech Republic (25 percent). Only in Hungary (13 percent) and Slovakia (14 percent) are the numbers low.

In part, this surge in doubt may have arisen because the once-distant virtues of membership look less convincing on close inspection. Certainly, the results of negotiations with the EU have disappointed regional politicians. First, progress has been slow, delaying access to the benefits of membership. And now, as discussions have finally begun on the allocation of structural funds and agricultural subsidies, the scale of wealth redistribution appears small. In some countries, disappointment has turned into resentment--some Czech politicians, for instance, claim their country has been treated as an unequal partner--or into concern about being ignored, as in Poland.

But politicians involved in negotiations remain by and large committed to enlargement. It is the general public in the candidate countries, for whom the details of such negotiations are largely inaccessible, that is showing most signs of disenchantment.

Dreams, Familiarity and Disconnection

Familiarity may, to some extent, breed opposition. The countries that are farthest away from the EU, both physically and politically, are also the keenest supporters of enlargement--support stands at 97 percent in Romania and 95 percent in Bulgaria. In those countries, the public's enthusiasm for joining reflects the hope of a better life rather than an informed political choice. That has encouraged a consensus among the political elite. For politicians, the prospect of membership in a prosperous and secure EU is a carrot dangled before voters to compensate for painful restructuring and austerity programs.

In countries with stronger economies and a better chance of joining the EU soon, support for enlargement is not as strong. According to a study by the European Commission (EC) released in June 2001, citizens of Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Poland tend to have a less idealized view of the EU, one that focuses more on the economy. The scepticism in each of those countries, the EC argues, has distinct national characteristics. In this interpretation, Estonians are somewhat "Scandinavian" in their sensibilities, while Latvians blame some of their economic difficulties on "unrealistic" EU requirements and are afraid of the challenges of integration. The Czechs acknowledge the scope of the European larger plan but believe there is a marked gap between EU promises and reality. The EC believes that the Poles view the EU primarily as a rich man's club.

To the extent that direct experience with the EU has helped form such reservations, the growing Euroscepticism in the region appears to be an informed choice. However, very few people --just 2 percent across the region, according to the Eurobarometer survey--say they feel well informed about enlargement matters. This is not surprising. Negotiations go on behind closed doors, media coverage is vague, and membership seems distant. In other words, citizens of the front-running candidates for EU membership seem to have a less idealized view of the enlargement process but feel disconnected--and both familiarity and disconnection foster Euroscepticism.

The importance of a "sense of connection" is highlighted in the Baltic states, where NATO membership enjoys huge support but EU membership is viewed very sceptically. For the people of these three former Soviet republics, NATO is considered an important safeguard against Russia and seems simpler to understand. In contrast, they feel uninformed about EU membership (indeed, they feel less informed than anyone else in the region), and view EU integration as complex and distant and as having less clear-cut benefits.

Two Visegrad countries--Hungary and Slovakia--present little evidence of Euroscepticism. An explanation of their distinctiveness would require deeper country-specific analyses, but one thing connects the two and differentiates them from their Visegrad peers and Slovenia--a lack of political debate. In Hungary, all parties, including two potentially anti-EU parliamentary parties (the populist Smallholders Party and the extreme right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIEP), have signed an agreement on support for the EU. In Slovakia, all parliamentary parties, including the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), favor EU membership. While the sincerity of those two parties can be questioned and while some Slovak parties may be concerned about national sovereignty, they have yet to produce statements in any way comparable to the Eurosceptic views voiced by former Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, according to Sharon Fisher, an analyst at PlanEcon.

Public debate is gaining momentum in some countries. Poland is a case in point. Jacek Kucharczyk, the deputy director of the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs, has noted that the presence of two clearly Eurosceptic parties in the Polish parliament--the League of Polish Families and Self-Defense--has brought about a change in public opinion. "The fact that those opposition parties feel the need to be critical of the government's position at all times has undermined the pro-European consensus," Kucharczyk said. "But outspoken and aggressive Eurosceptics have received a lot of media attention. Public debate has therefore greatly increased." Indeed, with 33 percent of Poles against membership, Poland has actually surpassed the Czech Republic as the leading Eurosceptic among the Visegrad group. In part, Czech scepticism may reflect the fact that many politicians in the country tend to present EU membership as a necessary evil, as Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde have argued, rather than as a worthy goal.

Transition Pains

While there are many differences between the candidate countries in their attitudes toward the EU, there is one prominent cross-national psychological factor: many people in the region associate EU membership with the painful transition of the past decade. Across the region, the EC's study suggests that Eurosceptics mainly belong to the middle to lower socio-professional categories, which have experienced an unequal distribution of the economic pie as well as a real deterioration in living standards over the past decade. This group, which is made up primarily of pensioners and public-sector workers, believes EU membership will widen the gaps in society. A recent statistical analysis at Princeton University arrived at the same conclusion.

The EU's study adds that, beyond those who perceive themselves as potential "double losers," another anti-EU group can be identified across the region--those who oppose the free market in general. This mixed group includes radical leftists as well as extreme nationalists. To left-wing anti-EU groups, the post-1989 transition and EU accession is associated with crumbling public services, a disappearing social safety net, disintegration of the social fabric, higher crime, and corruption.

Aleks Szczerbiak of the Sussex European Institute has divided Eurosceptics into two groups: "hard" Eurosceptics, who (like radical leftists) reject outright the entire European integration project, and "soft" Eurosceptics, whose opposition to the EU is qualified. He further divides "soft" Eurosceptics into "policy Eurosceptics" and "national-interest Eurosceptics." Policy Eurosceptics are pro-EU but oppose deeper European integration and greater powers for Brussels. In practice, they object, for example, to particular provisions of the Maastricht treaty and the adoption of the euro. National-interest Eurosceptics assert the primacy of national interests in EU debates. Both forms of soft-boiled scepticism are, however, compatible with support for the principle of integration.

Across the region, hard Eurosceptics have been largely confined to the fringes of politics. Some of the Eurosceptically minded parties may be headed by outspoken politicians--from Vaclav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic, Andrzej Lepper's Self-Defense in Poland, and Vladimir Meciar's HZDS in Slovakia--but their attitudes toward the EU relegate them to the soft Eurosceptic category. The region has yet to produce a party that has developed a powerful "hard" Eurosceptic platform.

All of this opposition looks rather mild when set against the EU experience. Enlargement has already been voted down in one referendum, when the Irish rejected the Treaty of Nice in June 2001, which aimed, among others, at comprehensive institutional reform of the EU. Also, only a minority of EU citizens--43 percent, according to an EU study--support enlargement. Almost as many (35 percent) downright oppose it. A 'no' vote would be particularly high in the two most influential countries, Germany (42 percent) and France (47 percent). In contrast, a referendum would succeed in every country in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary would approve of the plan with 87 percent of the votes, and even in Estonia and Latvia, referendums would pass with the support of 59 percent. What is more, few "hard" Eurosceptics have so far emerged anywhere in the region.

That may change in coming years. The Czech Communist Party, a comprehensive critic of the EU, is already well represented in parliament, having won 11 percent of the vote in the 1998 elections. The League of Polish Families is starting to show signs of adopting a hard line, according to Kucharczyk. As time goes by, Euroscepticism will probably be more widespread as well as "harder." The experience of member states suggests that Euroscepticism will increase once Central and Eastern Europeans gain firsthand knowledge of membership, unless their "sense of connection" with the EU increases. That may not be encouraging for those who believe in the persuasive power of the European integration process--but another lesson is that serious anti-EU platforms will emerge in Central and Eastern Europe only after the costs and benefits of membership have been evaluated.